Esteemed chair,

In addition to the statement delivered by the European Union, I would like to deliver the following statement in my national capacity.

The objective of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. The IAEA safeguards play a central role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the independent verification of States’ compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings.

In order for the IAEA to be able to do its safeguards work properly, the non-proliferation regime and the legally binding safeguards obligations must remain credible and strong.  Therefore, we must strive for the universalisation of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP), which would allow the IAEA to effectively verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and nuclear facilities in a State. States with an outdated Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) must amend or rescind it.

In addition, IAEA and members states should make sure safeguard methods are being developed to keep pace with evolving technologies, such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Furthermore, safeguard methods should also be implemented by design. Therefore, the Netherlands supports the further development of so-called State Level Approaches.

Member States should fully cooperate with the IAEA and ensure that it has all the political, technical and financial support to meet its safeguards responsibilities. We underscore the importance of the full, impartial, independent and objective implementation of safeguards and strongly support the IAEA’s efforts in delivering on its mandate.

For the effective functioning of the safeguards system compliance by all Member States is essential. The Netherlands is very concerned that some States do not fully adhere to the IAEA safeguards system which undermines its integrity. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s alarming expansion of its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and its continued failing to fulfil its obligations under the NPT to provide adequate explanations concerning the outstanding safeguards questions. Iran must cooperate with the Agency to provide the assurance that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Similarly, Syria must answer questions on what happened at its undeclared suspected nuclear site in Dair Alzour.

We urge the DPRK to return to full compliance with its NPT obligations as a non-nuclear-weapon State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to bring into force an Additional Protocol to that Agreement.

We call upon the DPRK to abandon all its nuclear weapons in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Chair,

Let me also stress the central role of the IAEA in sustaining and strengthening the global nuclear security architecture and in coordinating and facilitating international cooperation and capacity building. We call on all States to accede to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) and to endorse the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC/869).

We like to commend the IAEA for its permanent presence at nuclear facilities in Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. We call upon Russia to urgently withdraw its military and other unauthorised personnel from the Zaporizhzhia NPP and immediately return the plant to the full control of the sovereign and competent Ukrainian authorities to ensure its safety and security. We reiterate that the IAEA’s seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in armed conflicts and the five principles established for the ZNPP must be respected. The IAEA Support and Assistance Missions at the ZNPP must have access to all requested locations, information and personnel.

Finally, Chair, we like to stress the contribution of effective export controls to the implementation of the non-proliferation regime. All States Parties have agreed, under Articles I and II of the NPT, to ensure that exports do not directly or indirectly assist nuclear-weapon programs and that they are in full conformity with the Treaty. The Netherlands is strongly committed to upholding the highest standards of export controls. Effective and transparent export controls are not only significant in their role to prevent proliferation, but also important for facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Thank you for giving me the floor.